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Risk management has been proven to be a valuable tool to identify and mitigate risks 
early in the program life-cycle. Modernization and communication advances have 
recently changed the commercial economy from national to global. Companies are 
starting to venture into new partnerships with foreign companies. However, there has also 
been an increase in business corruption, like Fannie Mac and Enron, which has raised 
skepticism in entering new partnerships. Industry is addressing this fact by no longer 
exclusively depending on science as the determining factor in risk assessment and 
starting to include trust as a factor in risk management. Qualitative measurements are 
being analyzed in attempted to address these uncertainties by incorporating “trust” into 
the risk management process. The purpose of this paper was to determine whether it was 
feasible and advantageous to incorporate “trust” into the risk management process for 
Department of Defense (DOD) acquisition. The premise of this research was that there 
were hidden risk factors attributed to qualitative measures that were not being identified 
in current DOD risk management processes. A preliminary conclusion of this thesis is 
that trust is a valuable factor in the risk assessment process that can help identify 
qualitative risk elements. 
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Risk management has been proven to be a valuable tool to identify and mitigate risks 
early in the program life-cycle. Modernization and communication advances have 
recently changed the commercial economy from national to global. Companies are 
starting to venture into new partnerships with foreign companies. However, there has also 
been an increase in business corruption, like Fannie Mac and Enron, which has raised 
skepticism in entering new partnerships. Industry is addressing this fact by no longer 
exclusively depending on science as the determining factor in risk assessment and 
starting to include trust as a factor in risk management. Ronald Regan once said, “Trust, 
but verify” when he was entering into the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty with 
his new foreign partner Russia (Massie 2013).  
The purpose of this paper was to determine whether it was feasible and 
advantageous to incorporate “trust” into the risk management process for Department of 
Defense (DOD) acquisition. The premise of this research was that there were hidden risk 
factors attributed to qualitative measures that were not being identified in current DOD 
risk management processes. These qualitative measures of risk could be directly linked to 
trust elements. This research paper presents an argument on why trust should be 
incorporated into the risk management process for DOD acquisition programs. Various 
social, behavior, theological, and technical expert definitions on the term trust were used 
to decompose trust, in the field of risk, into three key elements; confidence, vulnerability, 
and uncertainty. The three trust elements: confidence, vulnerability and uncertainty, were 
further defined and correlated with current industry program risk management practices. 
Based on the analysis of the three trust elements, trust was defined for the purpose and 
use in risk management. Trust for risk management was defined as the subjective 
probability of a positive outcome from an agreement between two or more parties for a 
domain specific task based on the capability and goodwill of the trustee and predictability 
of a positive outcome within the defined technical, cost, and schedule boundaries.  
Modernization of communication paths (i.e., e-mail and video teleconferencing), 
and quick technology advancement have opened industry to new partners in a global 
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economy. In addition, an influx of business corruption has left people and companies 
skittish about openly trusting their partners. New business partners lead to possible 
confidence, vulnerability, and uncertainty concerns. Companies have to weigh these trust 
elements when entering new partnerships and throughout the contract. To accentuate the 
point of global business partnership trust based risks, this thesis analyzed a case study on 
the Boeing 777 Dreamliner program which had an unprecedented scale of development 
outsourcing—65 percent of the development work was outsourced to more than 100 
suppliers from 12 countries (Exostar 2007; Horng and Bozdogan 2007). Prior to the case 
study analysis, a validation of the case study was conducted against Robert Yin’s 
research on case study design and methods (Yin 2009) and Gary Langford’s research on 
engineering methods (Langford 2012). The case study was concluded as valid and 
appropriate for analysis for the topic of this research on trust in risk management. The 
analysis of the case study determined there were risk items associated with each trust 
element (confidence, vulnerability, and uncertainty) that could have been identified 
earlier if trust had been incorporated into Boeing’s risk management process. 
Research was also conducted on the feasibility of incorporating the trust elements 
of risk into the risk management process for DOD acquisition. The relationship between 
trust and risk was defined from social science research and using scientific methods. By 
examining social science research it was determined that to capture the likelihood and 
consequence of an action that requires dependence on other individuals to take action, the 
element of trust should be assessed. Through logic and psychometrics studies of risk and 
trust, it was determined that risk and trust were inversely related. The Dempster-Shafer 
theory was used to prove that trust elements could be added as long as there is no major 
conflict between the sources. The principle of indifference (Keynes 1921) supported the 
theory that each element should be weighed equally since we have no idea which element 
is more plausible. Alexander McNeil’s (2005) research on the axiom of coherence was 
applied to conclude that risk and trust elements were additive. However, the process is 
not simple mathematical addition, since trust and risk are inversely related. Gary 
Langford’s (2007) method for managing complexity warranted the use of geometric 
relationships to combine risk and trust into a matrix report.  
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The current Risk Management Guide for DOD Acquisition (DOD 2006) was 
studied and the process was decomposed to determine how and where the qualitative 
measures (trust factors) of risk could be addressed. The most practical place for the trust 
elements of risk to be analyzed was during the analysis of the quantitative measurement 
of risk. A detailed step by step example of how to take a risk item through the proposed 
risk and trust management process for DOD acquisition was described. Qualitative 
assessment measurement definitions for all three trust elements; confidence, 
vulnerability, and uncertainty were created. Example questions were also provided to 
assist in identifying trust risks. The risk management example highlighted how a risk 
item that was assessed quantitatively as a low risk was raised to a medium risk when 
qualitative measurements (trust) were included in the evaluation. 
In conclusion, this research paper posits that the incorporation of trust into the risk 
management process for DOD acquisition is feasible and advantageous. The proposed 
risk and trust management process will provide the program manager more insight into 
the root cause of the risk. Clearer insight into the root cause will aid in management of 
risk and resource allocation for mitigating risk. 
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Risk management has been proven to be a valuable tool to identify and mitigate 
risks early in the program life-cycle. World-wide modernization and communication 
advances have recently changed the commercial economy from national to global. 
Companies are starting to venture into new partnerships with foreign companies to 
increase their market share (Marzec 2014). However, there has also been an increase in 
business corruption, like Fannie Mac and Enron, which has raised skepticism in entering 
new partnerships. Industry is addressing this fact by no longer exclusively depending on 
science as the determining factor in risk assessment and starting to include trust as a 
factor in risk management. Ronald Regan once said, “Trust, but verify” when he was 
entering into the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty with his new foreign partner 
Russia (Massie 2013). This research paper explores the various industries’ approaches to 
incorporating trust into the risk management process and extracts those ideas and 
processes that could be employed into the Department of Defense (DOD) acquisition risk 
management process. A preliminary conclusion of this thesis research paper is that trust 
is a valuable factor in the risk assessment process that can help identify additional 
(hidden) risks. The information gathered in this research is formulated into a measurable 
weighted metric of “trust” that may be incorporated into the DOD acquisition risk 
management process in an attempt to highlight program qualitative risks that were 
previously overlooked.  
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this paper was to determine whether it was feasible and 
advantageous to incorporate “trust” into the risk management process for Department of 
Defense (DOD) acquisition. The premise of this research was that there were hidden risk 
factors attributed to qualitative measures that were not being identified in current DOD 
risk management processes. These qualitative measures of risk could be directly linked to 
trust elements. The ability to identify areas where trust can lead to risk will enable 
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program management to apply the resources and oversight required to mitigate these 
epistemic risks to minimize cost or schedule loss.  
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
There is an enormous amount of research material on the topic of trust and risk 
management. In order to focus this research on the purpose of incorporating trust into the 
risk management process for DOD acquisition the following research questions are 
posed.  
First, define trust. Specifically, in what ways and in what contexts has trust been 
defined, as related to risk assessment?  
Second, determine what has changed in society that has made “trust” a larger 
factor in the risk management process. Was there some event or invention that has caused 
companies to elevate the factor of trust?  
Third, in what ways has trust been incorporated in commercial sector risk 
assessment process? Research focuses on how various industries are identifying trust 
issues and mitigating them as part of the risk management process. 
Fourth, determine the relationship between trust and risk. Can the element of trust 
and risk be combined into a single solution set? 
The final research question is targeted at determining whether the process of 
incorporating trust into the DOD acquisition risk management process is feasible. In 
addition, are there benefits in identifying, analyzing, monitoring and managing 
qualitative risks that would be highlighted by incorporating trust?  
D. BENEFIT OF STUDY 
This research can be used to improve the DOD acquisition risk management 
process through the incorporation of trust. A qualitative and quantitative science based 
methodology will be used to determine the feasibility of combing trust and risk. The 
proposed risk and trust management process will provide the program manager improved 
insight into the root cause of the risk. Clearer insight into the root cause of risk will 
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enhance the ability of program management to mitigate risk and prevent cost over runs or 
schedule loss.  
E. METHODOLOGY 
This research paper examines various social science expert definitions of trust, 
creates a decomposition of the trust definitions, and then develops a standard definition of 
“trust” for risk management. This research paper explores various reasons why industry 
has turned to explore trust as an element of risk in its business practices. Multiple 
experts’ views, in the field of trust and risk research, were investigated to determine the 
feasibility of incorporating trust into a risk management process. Additional research was 
conducted to explore the possible methods to combine trust and risk into the risk 
management process. These methods were translated into a process that could be 
employed into the DOD acquisition risk management process. The information gathered 
was formulated into a measurable weighted matrix of “trust” that may be incorporated 
into the DOD acquisition risk management process in an attempt to highlight program 
risks that were previously overlooked. A contemporary case study of the Boeing 787 
Dreamliner manufacturing program was validated then investigated to demonstrate the 
value of trust in the risk management process. 
The purpose, methodology and research questions stated above guided this 
research paper. The following paragraphs will lead the reader through the research 
findings and conclusions. The next chapter will lay the foundation of this thesis by 
defining trust and reviewing some of the societal changes that have increased industries 
interest in evaluating trust in business. 
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The word, “trust,” originates back in the 13th century from the Old Norse word, 
“traust,” which was defined as “help, confidence, support’” (Merriam-Webster 2014). 
Traust is cognate with the German word “Trost,” which means comfort (Dictionary.com 
2014). In addition, the word trust was also akin to the Old English word, “trēowe,” which 
means, “faithful” (Merriam-Webster 2014). The origin of trust points directly to the 
interaction between two or more parties. The synonyms of trust are confidence, 
expectation, faith, hope, assurance, certainty, conviction, credence, dependence, reliance, 
stock, and sureness. Figure 1 presents a visual depiction of the word trust (Visual 
Thesaurus 2014). 
 
Figure 1.  Trust Visual Thesaurus (from Visual Thesaurus 2014) 
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All of these words have a positive connotation and base their premise on an 
interaction with another party. To verify the opposite side of the argument, the antonyms 
of the word “trust” were then analyzed. The most common antonyms were distrust and 
mistrust, which were both defined as “to have no trust or confidence in (someone or 
something)” (Merriam-Webster 2014). Other common antonyms are disbelief, doubt, 
uncertainty, and suspect. As before, each of these terms was based on the premise that 
there is an interaction between two or more parties.  
As a result, one can conclude that trust is the basic element to any cooperative 
relationship. Therefore, when entering a business contract, it is very important that 
everyone have the same definition of trust. This is much more complex than it originally 
seems. If one asks 20 strangers to define trust….after the initial “huh” statement, one will 
likely get 20 different answers. This simple question is so complicated because there are 
several variations of trust. Trust has been around for centuries and has evolved based on 
people’s values and personal experiences. The definition of trust can also change based 
on a person’s point of view: economic, behavioral, social, or physiological. Each 
variation has a different connotation and is used for different purposes. Table 1 lists some 
of the various definitions of trust as defined by social science experts from their field’s 
point of views.  
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Table 1.   Various Trust Definitions 
Theory Trust Definition Author 
Economics  “Decisions about trust are similar to other forms of 
risky choice; individuals are presumed to be motivated 
to make rational, efficient choices (i.e., to maximize 




Psychology  “Trusting behavior occurs when an individual 
perceives an ambiguous path, the result of which 
could be good or bad, and the occurrence of the good 




Subjective ‘‘[T]rust is the mutual confidence that one’s 
vulnerability will not be exploited in an exchange’’  
Barney and 
Hansen (1994) 




Information  “Trust is that which is essential to a communication 
channel but cannot be transferred from a source to a 
destination using that channel.” 
Ed Gerck (1998) 
Common 
Definition 
“Trust is a belief that someone will do some function 





‘‘Trust is an expectancy of positive (or nonnegative) 
outcomes that one can receive based on the expected 







‘‘[T]rust as a state involving confident positive 
expectations about another’s motives with respect to 
oneself in situations entailing risk’’ 
Boon and Holmes 
(1991) 
Behavioral ‘‘[T]rust ... is a particular level of the subjective 
probability with which an agent assesses that another 






This research is only going to focus on the risk management aspect of trust. More 
precisely, how trust can play a part in a program’s risk management process? By 
analyzing the trust definitions from a risk perspective a few common elements can be 
pulled out. The three common elements of trust with respect to risk are confidence, 
vulnerability, and uncertainty. These three elements will be examined further to complete 
the definition of trust in the area of risk management.  
1. Confidence 
The first element of trust in risk management is confidence. Confidence in 
business can be defined as the belief that the partner has the tools and capability to 
perform the task that is required. Contractors may have the best intentions and really try 
to perform a task; however, sometimes the technology is above their capability. For 
example, this author worked on a missile detection program in which the awarded 
contractor was known for producing missiles and a missile warning protection system 
that both operated in the one frequency spectrum band. During award selection, the 
consensus, which should have been deemed invalid, was that a contractor that built 
missiles and threat detectors in one frequency spectrum band should also be able to 
develop a missile detection system that operated in the different frequency spectrum 
band. In the end, the contractor was unable to deliver a missile detection system in the 
different frequency band. This cost the tax payers millions of dollars and the war-fighter 
a three-year delay in capability. A contributing factor to the failure of the program was 
the contractor’s lack expertise in the different frequency spectrum. The government 
bestowed too much confidence in the contractor’s experience in the original spectrum 
when evaluating its capability to develop a system in a different spectrum. This is but one 
example of how adding trust into the risk management process could lead to better 
choices. Most people would not trust a stock broker to fix their car. Nor would most 
people trust a mechanic to invest their money in the stock market. Confidence as related 
to trust should be domain specific to the task being assigned to performed.  
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Another example of a poor selection of a prime contractor based on blind 
confidence is the Affordable HealthCare website release. As reported by the Washington 
Post, “The lead contractor on the dysfunctional Website for the Affordable Care Act is 
filled with executives from a company that mishandled at least 20 other government IT 
projects” (Markon and Crites 2013). So why was this company selected if it had been 
linked to previous troubled programs? The reason was simple: based on past performance 
(1970s–1990s), the company had built a reputation as the best company for Health and 
Human Services IT programs. As a result, CGI Federal was placed on a prescreening list 
that put them as front runners for any urgent projects. However, due to senior executive 
and a high employee turnover rate at the end of the 1990s, the company was not the same 
company and started struggling with the completing programs on time and within budget. 
“They did not provide us one working piece of software after almost six years,’’ recalled 
Ed Buelow Jr., the Mississippi state’s former revenue commissioner (Markon and Crites 
2013). Confidence in a company to perform a task should not only be based relative past 
performance but also include a real-time snapshot of a partner’s current program(s) 
performance and domain specific technical capability. Chapter IV will discuss how to 
assess confidence levels. 
2. Vulnerability 
The second element of trust in risk management is vulnerability. The vulnerability 
side of trust can be taken from Chiles and McMackin (1996, 85) where they define trust 
as ‘‘the expectation that an exchange partner will not engage in opportunistic behavior, 
even in the face of countervailing short-term incentives and uncertainty about long-term 
benefits.’’ In other words, in business a company must determine who they can trust to 
follow through on an agreement. As Francis Fukuyama (1995, 26) points out, “the most 
effective organizations are based on communities of shared ethical values.” Industries, 
such as networking systems, e-commerce, and financial banking, have taken this notion 
and moved to minimize vulnerability with new global partners companies by looking for 
companies that share mission statements and/or ethical values. Companies, within these 
industries, are evaluating potential partner company’s values by assessing with whom 
they already have business partnerships. For example, Subaru is well known for valuing 
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safety. Therefore, if Subaru is looking for a business partnership with a windshield 
company, Subaru will look for a windshield company that works with other companies 
known for safety, such as Volvo. To assess a business partner’s ethical values and 
integrity, companies are researching common associations of potential partners, such as 
the charities they support, community involvement, and professional organizations with 
which they are associated, such as International Council on Systems Engineering 
(INCOSE). Castelfranchi and Falcone (2000) refer to this notion as relational capital on 
which trust is built. 
Another side of vulnerability is to assess the trustee’s intention and willingness to 
act in the interests of the trustor, otherwise known as goodwill (Das and Teng 2001). 
Companies must determine the level to which their partner is committed to their 
relationship. Piotr Sztompka (1999) brings up a similar argument by asserting that if the 
companies are co-dependent on each other to sustain and/or build up their company’s 
infrastructure then risk is reduced. In addition, if both parties are looking to promote a 
long term relationship then vulnerability goes down and risk is reduced. Most business 
relationships will not have equal dependence on one another, but the trustee must take 
this measurement into account as a risk to the program. If the trusted has little mutual 
benefit in the success of a program’s success, then the trusted company could walk away 
when provided a better opportunity, or just reprioritize its resources, which could cause 
delays to its delivery of product to the trustee (i.e., other business partner). Karahannas 
and Jones (1999, 347) note that trust is “closely related to risk, since without vulnerability 
there is no need for trust.” Therefore, a company must determine their level of 
vulnerability to determine the level of trust the company is betrothing to the trustor (i.e., 
business partner). This level of trust will ultimately indicate the companies risk level. 
Chapter IV will discuss how to determine a company’s vulnerability level. 
3. Uncertainty 
The third element of trust in risk management is uncertainty. The term “risk” is 
generally used to describe adverse events with a known probability (Adams 1995). 
Uncertainty stems from the lack of knowledge and therefore has an unknown probability, 
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also known as epistemic uncertainty (Amendola 2002). This lack of knowledge could 
stem from a new technology being developed or a new manufacturing process that a 
company is employing for the first time. International organizations such as INCOSE, 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO), DOD, and Software Engineering 
Institute (SEI) have tried to minimize this uncertainty by setting up standard processes for 
companies to follow. As a result, companies will often require that their contractors to 
have certain process certifications, such as ISO 9000 or Capability Maturity Model 
Integration (CMMI), and required that the contractor follow/maintain these processes for 
the duration of the program under contract. However, a company may have a certification 
but never employed this certified process in the domain of the current task. For example, 
a company can be CMMI level 5 for developing missiles, but never have employed the 
process for sensor development. Therefore, even with these controls in place there is 
always uncertainty. Companies do not have the time or ability to work out probability 
expectations for every possible outcome, nor can a company brainstorm every possible 
problem that may occur. In order to facilitate the process of calculating the probability of 
the unknown, companies typically set aside additional funding and resources, called 
“management reserve,” to deal with a level of uncertainty. However, the amount of 
“management reserve” set aside for a program is an estimate and generally based on a 
high level of confidence that things will go according to plan. The above sediment is 
supported by Luhmann (1979), “In situations of uncertainty, trust allows short-cutting 
probability calculations and thus reduces complexity.” The problem with this approach is 
that the management reserve account is typically managed only by the program manager 
allowing the funding and resources set aside for uncertainty to be used for other tasking. 
Therefore, risk is elevated by depleting funding and resources intended for uncertainty. 
Chapter IV will discuss how to assess a program’s uncertainty level. 
4. Trust Defined in Risk Management 
Based on the analysis of the definitions of trust from the various social science 
fields and the derived trust elements, a definition for trust for the field of risk 
management can be affirmed. This research defines trust for the purpose of program risk 
management as the subjective probability of a positive outcome from an agreement 
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between two or more parties for a domain specific task based on the capability and 
goodwill of the trustee and predictability of a positive outcome within the defined 
technical, cost and schedule boundaries. 
B. HOW HAS SOCIETY CHANGED TO ELEVATE THE IMPORTANCE OF 
TRUST? 
Niklas Luhmann (1979) stated that trust gains in importance as society becomes 
more modern. The combination of new technology, system complexity and 
modernization raises the likelihood of uncertainty and risk. Two distinctive points can be 
pulled from Luhamm’s comment: society modernization and technology. World-wide 
modernization and communication advances have recently changed the commercial 
economy from national to global. Communication advancements over the past three 
decades, such as video teleconferencing and e-mail, have aided this global partnership to 
develop business partners internationally. Businesses are no longer handcuffed to 
partnering with local companies and are branching out to partner with foreign companies 
for three main reasons: cost, component specialist / expertise, and proximity / market 
share (Marzec 2014). Companies are looking to reduce their overhead costs, facility 
labor, utilities and real estate taxes, and have found costs cheaper overseas (Hamlett 
2014). As products get more complex, they require multiple specialized components to be 
manufactured. The cost of setting up a manufacturing product line for every component 
in a complex product (e.g., manufacturing a computer, airplane, or car) would be too 
burdensome for one company. Outsourcing production to a second company that has 
expertise in producing the material can decrease production time (Hamlett 2014). 
Another advantage is if the product line changes or a repair to equipment is required, the 
responsibility for the cost associated with this process falls on the supplier (Hamlett 
2014). Therefore, companies look to outside manufacturers to supply their specialty 
components. Proximity reflects the global growth of the market place. Companies are 
always looking to increase their market share, and modernization of other countries has 
produced new foreign customers. As a result, companies are outsourcing some of their 
manufacturing to foreign countries in hopes of getting their business. For example, 
Boeing’s Dreamliner program had an unprecedented scale of development outsourcing—
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65 percent of the development work was outsourced to more than 100 suppliers from 12 
countries (Exostar 2007; Horng and Bozdogan 2007). This program will be analyzed as a 
case study in Chapter V. While these new partnerships may open companies to profits, 
they also open the company to the trust elements or risk in confidence, vulnerability, and 
uncertainty. As part of this global business partnership, companies are relying on both 
quantitative risk analysis, but also qualitative risk analysis (also known as trust analysis) 
to determine a company’s trustworthiness. For example, the banking industry is updating 
their small business lending models to use qualitative information along with financial 
information to forecast small company’s creditworthiness (Grunet 2005). Qualitative data 
that companies may gather include information about the reputation of the company by 
asking questions such as: how does the company treat its own employees (What is the 
turnover rate?); how long the company has been in business?, what are the employee skill 
sets that the company hires? and, who were the company’s past business relationships? 
Companies are also looking into potential partners’ past performance to determine 
qualitative risk using questions such as: does the company meet their obligations? and 
has the company met deadlines and provided their product on time? Favorable responses 
to these qualitative risks are the building blocks of trust in a business partnership and 
should be assessed during contract initiation and throughout the life cycle of a program. 
The last main contributor to companies adding qualitative risk assessment into 
their program management decisions is the influx of business corruption. A man’s word 
was his honor, and when he shook hands on a deal, it was followed through. But now 
litigation and profit are the dominant players. WorldCom, EnRon, and FreddieMac are 
just a few examples of how businesses have strayed from the path of trust as a priority to 
the path of profit as a priority, often compromising trust elements. As a result, companies 
look to protect themselves with well-crafted contracts by teams of lawyers, which 
basically state, “We don’t trust you.” This leads to the last point, most do not like to 
confront one another and say they do not trust each other. Imagine talking to a stranger in 
the airport line and after five minutes of meeting that person you tell him that you do not 
trust him but would like to be friends. That person will immediately be put on the 
defensive, and you are not likely to develop a friendship. The same holds true in 
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business; starting off a business relationship by openly stating distrust is not a good way 
to build cohesion in the relationship. As a result, some companies tend to ignore the 
qualitative risks to avoid confrontation and lean toward assumed trust.  
In this chapter, a definition of trust was derived based on the analysis of the 
definitions of trust from the various social science fields. The definition of trust was 
decomposed into three key elements: confidence, vulnerability and uncertainty. Each 
element of trust was defined to establish a standard definition to support this research 
paper. In addition, this chapter highlighted some of the factors and past historical events 
that have caused trust to become more influential to companies when making business 
decisions. The following chapter will summarize the Risk Management Guide for DOD 
Acquisition to construct the foundation for incorporating trust into the established risk 
management process. 
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III. DOD RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS 
A. DEFINED 
Risk management is the overarching process that encompasses risk identification, 
analysis, mitigation planning, mitigation plan implementation, and tracking (DOD 2006). 
The purpose of risk management is to identify cost, schedule, and technical risks that may 
occur in the future of a program so that each risk item can be monitored and/or 
controlled. The Risk Management Guide for DOD Acquisition breaks risk into three 
components: 1) it must be a future root cause that can be overcome or avoided, 2) the risk 
has a likelihood of occurring if not managed, and 3) there is a consequence of cost, 
schedule and/or technical performance if the risk realized. By addressing program risks 
early on, the potential for program cost and schedule overruns may be mitigated. In 
addition, risk management may also forecast technical risks that could be mitigated or 
overcome by applying additional resources earlier than originally planned. 
The first step in the risk management process is to identify the risk items of a 
program. In order to identify risk, one must know what is the definition of risk, general 
practices on how risks can be identified, and who should identify risk. The Risk 
Management Guide for DOD Acquisition summarizes risk as the root cause that can 
prevent a program from achieving performance goals and objectives within defined 
performance constraints, cost, and schedule over the life cycle of the program. Best 
practice to identifying risk is to decompose the program into the work breakdown 
structure (WBS) elements and allow the system matter experts to identify risk for each 
WBS based on prior experience, according to the Risk Management Guide for DOD 
Acquisition (2006). Risk identification should not only occur at the beginning of a 
program. Risk should continually be identified in all facets of the program to include the 
ability to assess technical performance, schedule, resource availability, program cost, 
manufacturing process and contractor earned value management (EVM) data/trends. 
Since risk affects all areas of the program, risk identification should be the job of the 
entire program team; this includes the test manager, financial manager, contracting 
officer, logistician, and every other team member, not just the program manager or 
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systems engineer. In addition, since the contractor’s ability to develop and manufacture 
the system affects program risks; the contractor should also be considered a valuable 
partner in risk planning. 
The identified risk must then be analyzed to determine how big the risk is. The 
Risk Management Guide for DOD Acquisition uses a Risk Reporting Matrix, Figure 2, to 
assess the level of risk for each risk item. The risk is reported as low (green), moderate 
(yellow), or high (red) based on the assigned values of likelihood and consequence of 
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Figure 2.  Risk Reporting Matrix (from DOD 2006) 
Each risk item is assigned a value for the likelihood of occurrence. The likelihood 
is the probability that an action could occur based on past experience and current data. A 
typical likelihood definition is depicted in Figure 3 (DOD 2006). An explanation of how 















Figure 3.  Levels of Likelihood Criteria (from DOD 2006) 
Each risk element is also assigned a consequence value. Consequence is an 
assessment of how the risk element will affect technical performance, schedule or cost if 
realized. A typical DOD Risk Management consequence definition table is shown in 
Figure 4 (DOD 2006). An explanation of how to read and use the consequence criteria 
figure is described in the following paragraphs. 
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Level Technical Performance Schedule Cost 
1 Minimal or no consequence to technical performance 
Minimal or no 
impact 
Minimal or no 
impact 
2 
Minor reduction in technical performance 
or supportability, can be tolerated with 
little or no impact on program 
Able to meet key 
dates. 





 < ** (1% of 
Budget) 
3 
Moderate reduction in technical 
performance or supportability with limited 
impact on program objectives 
Minor schedule slip. 
Able to meet key 
milestones with no 
schedule float. 
Slip < * month(s)  







 < ** (5% of 
Budget) 
4 
Significant degradation in technical 
performance or major shortfall in 
supportability; may jeopardize program 
success 
Program critical path 
affected. 





 < ** (10% of 
Budget) 
5 
Severe degradation in technical 
performance; Cannot meet KPP or key 
technical/supportability threshold; will 
jeopardize program success 
Cannot meet key 
program milestones.  
Slip > * months 
Exceeds APB 
threshold 
 > ** (10% of 
Budget)  
Figure 4.  Levels and Types of Consequence Criteria (from DOD 2006) 
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The risk item is then plotted on the 5X5 Risk Reporting Matrix (Figure 1) based 
on its likelihood and consequence values and the risk level is reported as low (green), 
moderate (yellow), or high (red). 
After the risk item has been assigned a risk value, the program risk team will 
attempt to identify mitigation steps that could potentially lower the likelihood or 
consequence value. For example, if the program is worried about a part not fitting in the 
aircraft, the program could hire someone to build a non-working prototype to conduct a 
fit check prior to the final system build.  
Once the mitigation steps are identified, the Integrated Program Team (IPT) can 
start making decisions on the specifics of what needs to be done, when in the schedule it 
can be accomplished, who is the responsible party, and is whether there is enough 
funding to implement the risk mitigation plan. 
Throughout the life cycle of the program, the program manager will track the 
progress of the risk items. In addition, the program will hold periodic Program Risk 
Management Boards to address new risk items and report on the status of the current risk 
items. Figure 5 shows the basic DOD Risk Management Process. The risk management 
process is iterative should continually be managed throughout the acquisition life cycle. 
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Figure 5.  DOD Risk Program Management Process (from DOD 2006) 
This chapter summarized the current DOD risk management process as outlined 
by the Risk Management Guide for DOD Acquisition. The process of risk identification, 
analysis, mitigation planning, mitigation plan implementation, and tracking was 
described. Risk was defined by three components: 1) it must be a future root cause that 
can be overcome or avoided, 2) the risk has a likelihood of occurring if not managed, and 
3) there is a consequence of cost, schedule and/or technical performance if the risk
realized. The current process of assessing risk on the 5X5 Risk Reporting Matrix based 
on the definitions of likelihood and consequence was reviewed. The following chapter 
will evaluate the feasibility and value of incorporating trust, as defined in Chapter II, into 
the DOD risk management process. 
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IV. ALIGNMENT OF TRUST INTO THE DOD RISK 
MANAGEMENT PROCESS 
A. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TRUST AND RISK 
The relationship between trust and risk must be defined in order to implement 
trust into the risk management process. Castelfranchi and Falcone (2000, 4) summarize 
the difference between risk and trust by stating, “risk is just about the possible outcome 
of a choice, about an event and a result; trust is about a person or organization: it mainly 
consists of beliefs, evaluations, and expectations about the other actor, his capabilities, 
willingness, and general motivations.” So, if risk and trust are not the same, how are they 
related? 
To determine the relationship between risk and trust one must answer, “Can risk 
exist without trust?” The answer is “yes.” The following simple example will rationalize 
this concept. Contrary to James Coleman’s (1990) notion that the decision to place trust 
is analogous to the decision to place a bet, placing a bet has no trust element. If a person 
goes to a casino and puts money in a slot machine, then the individual is taking a risk. 
The individual may lose or win money. The amount of risk can be calculated based on 
the odds of winning money (likelihood) and the total value of money (consequence) 
placed in the slot machine. The entire scenario revolves around one’s own choice. There 
is no individual to trust and therefore no element of trust in making a bet. Another 
example of an event that contains risk without an element of trust is a man cliff diving 
into the ocean. The man is risking his life (consequence) for the adrenaline rush 
(likelihood) achieved by cliff diving. Though there is a risk being taken by cliff diving, 
there is not a reliance on another individual and therefore no element of trust. Next, 
consider the reverse question of whether trust can exist without risk. The answer is “no.” 
As backed up by the various definitions of trust from Table 1, when an individual trusts 
someone or something to perform a task, he is taking a risk that someone or something 
will or will not perform the task. For example, if someone asks a friend to pick him up 
from the airport, then the requestor is taking a risk on that friend showing up on time or at 
all. If the friend is late to arrive at the designated time, then the requestor will lose 
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personal time that could have used to perform other tasks. If the friend does not show up 
at the airport, then the requestor will lose the time it takes me to devise a new plan, the 
cost (taxi, or rental car), and the additional time that the new plan incurs. Therefore, to 
capture the likelihood and consequence of an action that requires dependence on other 
individuals to take action, the element of trust should be assessed.  
B. WHY SHOULD TRUST BE PART OF THE DOD PROCESS 
A contract is a binding agreement of trust between the government and contractor. 
The government clearly defines its programmatic and technical requirements in a request 
for proposal. The contractors reply with their proposal to the contract accepting the stated 
programmatic and technical requirements and add the boundary conditions of cost and 
schedule. Then the government accepts a contractor’s proposal to make a binding 
contract between the two parties. Or as Howard Shore (2012, np) defined, “contractual 
trust is trust that exists only to the extent that things are explicitly agreed upon and one 
can only trust what people state in formal agreements.” The DOD acquisition starting 
point is a trusting agreement between two parties.  
Trust is also essential for a team to be functional. As Patrick Lencioni (2002) 
points out in his book The Five Dysfunctions of a Team, one of the five dysfunctions of a 
team is “the absence of trust.” Team members must be trust one another to be able to 
share ideas, different opinions and mistakes without fear of ridicule or job security. 
Ultimately, the IPT should reach a level of trust that the contractor is doing the work 
required to achieve the final goal. However, as the trust level decreases, people are 
slower to respond and less likely to divulge all the information. Slow and incomplete 
communications will lead to delayed and/or bad decisions and ultimately increase 
programmatic risks to cost and schedule. Therefore, the government and contractor have 
to maintain a level of trust to minimize the potential risk elements associated from 
mistrust. This theory is also supported by the work of Eddy Witzel (2014) exploring 
leader attitudes and behaviors that drive innovation. He found that both trust and risk 
were critical and were in tension. When a leader is trusted, that leader is allowed to take 
more risk. When the risk is successfully mitigated, the leader gains additional trust. 
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However, when the leader fails, trust is reduced and the leader is prevented from taking 
risk. It is hard to build a trusting business relationship between a particular contractor and 
government program team due to the following factors. First, the government is a 
bureaucratic entity in which processes rule the Acquisition Strategy, which does not 
allow for the flexibility of corporate relations. There can be no side agreements to 
add/remove capability or to buy more products unless explicitly stated in the contract. 
Second, the government contract is usually for one product/service with a contractor; it 
buys one item. There are no guarantees of future work and therefore no future 
dependency on the relationship with that company for the next project. Therefore, it is 
very important to monitor the trust level within the IPT by incorporating the element of 
trust into the risk management process. 
C. TRUST EXPRESSED MATHEMATICALLY 
This report has defined trust, its relationship with risk, and why it is important. 
The next task is to determine how to express trust mathematically to incorporate trust into 
the DOD Risk Management Process. The definition of business trust is the subjective 
probability of a positive outcome from an agreement between two or more parties for a 
domain specific task based on the capability and goodwill of the trustee, in the absence of 
knowledge. To make a probabilistic analysis of a risk item, one must have all the data for 
that event. However, the element of trust is subjective, and there is not a complete data 
set to make a probabilistic analysis. Subjective probability analysis can be defined using 
the Dempster-Shafer theory. The Dempster-Shafer theory is based the idea of obtaining 
degrees of belief (trust) for one question (risk item) from subjective probabilities (trust 
factor) (Shafer 1976). The Dempster-Shafer theory is based on belief (confidence) and 
plausibility (uncertainty) which matches nicely to the trust definition. In addition, the 
Dempster-Shafter theory also allows the combination of evidence from different sources 
to arrive at a degree of belief for a related question (risk) as long as there is no major 
conflict between the sources (Shafer 1976). And since the risk management members are 
all part of the IPT whose goal is for a successful program, there should be no major 
conflict between data. Therefore, one can conclude that the trust elements are additive. 
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Trust is made up of three sub-elements: confidence, vulnerability and uncertainty. 
To combine these three trust elements into one probability factor, a weight distribution 
for these factors must be defined. However, each of the trust elements is subjective with 
no rationale to determine which element is more plausible. Therefore, each trust element 
should be treated as equally likely to occur. This is supported by John Keynes’s principle 
of indifference. The principle of indifference, states “if there is no known reason for 
predicating of our subject one rather than another of several alternatives, then relatively 
to such knowledge the assertions of each of these alternatives have an equal probability” 
(Keynes 1921, 52–53) 
The mathematical relationship between risk and trust will now be defined. Risk 
has a negative connotation. Only under certain circumstances do companies want to be 
known for taking larger risk, for instance if the company is looking at competing for 
market share against a larger established company in a specific product market. However, 
trust has a positive connotation. Companies and people desire to achieve high trust as a 
part of their normal operation. So trust and risk are inversely related, generally. This 
theory is supported by psychometric studies of risk and trust, which often found risk and 
trust to be inversely related (Siegrist 2010).  
RISK = C/TRUST (where C is a constant). 
The theory of quantitative risk management was explored to determine whether or 
not to combine two factors of risk that are independent. Alexander McNeil explains how 
two risk factors that affect the outcome of an event are considered aggregate risks. Using 
the axiom of coherence, he demonstrates how aggregate risks are additive “for simple 
risks” (McNeil 2005). In conclusion, program risk could be equated by the summing the 
items of trust or items of risk. However, the process is not simple mathematical addition, 
since trust and risk are inversely related. Gary Langford’s method for managing 
complexity warranted the use of geometric relationships to combine risk and trust into a 
matrix report (Langford 2007). 
 45
1. Geometric Risk and Trust 
Based on the taxonomy of confidence, vulnerability and uncertainty: “An element 
e  of a system is associated with a risk, eR , defined by  
eeeeeee V)a1(XVUXR  , 
where confidence, eX , is the degree to which harmful events could impact the element; 
vulnerability, eU is the probability that element e  is degraded or fails in some specific 
way, if attacked; value, eV , results from a successful attack on element e ; and 
uncertainty, ea , is the likelihood that an asset will be found acceptable after a problem is 
realized. eV  is given by 





where )t(F is a function performed by the system, )t(P is the performance measure of 
the function )t(F , )t(Q is the quality, which is the tolerance assigned to )t(P , )t(I  is the 
investment of energy, matter, material wealth (e.g., dollars or other equivalent 
convenience of at-risk assets), and information. Time, t, is measured relative to the onset 
of period of interaction for which the system is at risk. If the unit of )t(Q  can be 
converted to the unit of )t(I , then the unit of V(t) is that of )t(P , since )t(F  is 
dimensionless (Langford 2007). Since an element in a system may be connected to more 
than one element, the number of interactions of each element is related to the number of 
elements and the number of links between the elements.  
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in which n  denotes the number of elements, m  the number of links, and ig denotes the 
degree of the 
thi  element” (Langford and Huynh 2007). 
To determine the number of elements and links, one must use the geometric 
theory. The number of elements m  is determined by the number of risk or trust elements 
related to a program risk and the links is calculated by the interfaces. For example, if 
there were three elements of risk and/or trust, then there are three links between elements. 
For four elements there are six links between elements. See Figure 6.  
 
Figure 6.  Geometric Relationship of Trust and Risk Elements 
The result of this process is to end up with a tuple of trust and risk: Tn (1,2,3,…), Rj 
(a,b,c,…). Therefore, the assessment of overall combined risk and trust assessment of 
program risk is best expressed in a matrix similar to the current Risk Reporting Matrix 
from the Risk Management Guide for DOD Acquisition (DOD 2006).  
D. IMPLEMENTATION OF TRUST IN THE DOD RISK MANAGEMENT 
PROCESS 
Chapter III summarizes how the current Risk Management Process for DOD 
Acquisition works. Risks are identified, evaluated and then each risk is assigned a value 
on the Risk Reporting Matrix. However, first one must define the values of the rating 
scale. In the case of the aggregation of risk and trust, the risk matrix must be set up based 
on the preference for either risk aversion or trust acceptance. Then the program will need 
to define the meanings of risk levels (high, moderate, and low) and the meanings of trust 
levels (high, moderate, and low) based on the bias for their acceptance of risk and trust. If 
the bias toward risk is that of high risk aversion and trust is deemed to be less important 
than risk (or, alternatively stated as, having an aversion to accepting trust as high except 





in the most extreme cases), then the following mappings of risk and trust to their 
definitions would be used for applying the aggregation of risk and trust in the Risk 
Matrix, Table 2. One must remember that low trust is equivalent to high risk, since they 
are inversely related. 
Table 2.   Risk and Trust Aggregate Matrix 
Level Risk Trust 
High (level 1) Possible, but not probable Low  
High (level 2 < level 1) Possible, not modeled Moderate  
High (level 3 < level 2) Possible, modeled High  
Moderate (level 4 < level 3) Unconfirmed / Good 
Estimate 
Low 
Moderate (level 5 < level 4) Unconfirmed / Fair Estimate Moderate 
Moderate (level 6 < level 5) Unconfirmed / Rough 
Estimate 
High 
Low (level 7 < level 6) Confirmed / Sketched Low 
Low (level 8 < level 7) Confirmed / Modeled Moderate  
Low (level 9 < level 8) Confirmed /Demonstrated High 
 
To help demonstrate how to implement trust into the Risk Management Process 
for DOD Acquisition, an example will be provided for a walk through demonstration of 
the process. A duplicate figure of the Risk Management Process for DOD Acquisition is 
added for reader ease, Figure 7.  
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Figure 7.  DOD Risk Program Management Process (DOD 2006)  
Step one is to identify a risk. For this example, the identified program risk is 
“Delivery of late s/w.” Step two is to analyze the risk. Assume that the IPT risk board 
members assessed the “Delivery of late s/w” risk as having a likelihood of two and a 
consequence of three based on the technical information that was available. Using the 
Risk Reporting Matrix from the Risk Management Process Guide for DOD Acquisition, 
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Figure 8.  Risk Reporting Example 
Following the current risk management process, the program risk board would 
move on to develop some mitigation steps for this risk item. However, this process would 
not account for the trust element of risk and not fully define the entire risk item. 
Therefore, the risk analysis section should be further decomposed by implementing a 
trust element analysis. The next step is to identify whether trust elements exist, and then 
analyze each trust element. As part of the trust assessment, the risk board would have to 
address questions such as: 1) are the programmers capable of completing the task 
(confidence)? 2) does management think that this program is a high priority to the 
contractor and has the contractor applied the right resources to get the task completed 
(vulnerability)? and 3) are the requirements ill defined (uncertainty)? These are just a few 
examples of questions, which are based on trust that are rarely asked at risk management 
board reviews. The proposed risk analysis section breakdown of the Risk Management 
Process for DOD Acquisition is shown in Figure 9. 
Delivery of late s/w 
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Figure 9.  Risk Analysis with Trust Factors 
The same example will now be evaluated using the risk and trust aggregate 
method. The risk identified was “Delivery of late s/w.” This risk was initially assigned as 
a likelihood of two and a consequence of three based on technical data and therefore 
rated as a low risk. To determine whether the identified risk has a trust element, the risk 
members must conclude that the risk item is dependent on others. In order to have an 
element of trust, the risk must rely on a second party to perform a task. In the case of the 
risk item “late software delivery,” the answer is yes. The next step is to analyze the risk 
element for a confidence element. To reiterate, confidence in business is defined as the 
belief that the partner has the tools and capability to perform the task that is required. 
Since delivering s/w is a task reliant upon a business partner, the answer is yes. Potential 
questions to address could be, are the programmers capable of completing the task 
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(confidence)? Or does management have a plan to apply the right resources to get the 
task completed (confidence)? The above two questions relate to the confidence that the 
stakeholders have in the ability of the contractors in delivering the software on time.  
If the stakeholders (all IPT members) were to rate their confidence value on these 
questions related to the risk item, using the Dempster-Shafter theory, the overall trust 
rating could increase or decrease the risk. For example, if there were ten members of the 
IPT and they were all asked to rate their trust value (percentage 0–100) for each question, 
one would get a confidence value for this risk. Confidence levels of low, medium, and 
high must be defined prior to performing the confidence level analysis to keep the 
analysis unbiased. Table 3 provides the confidence level definitions based on the mean 
value collected from the risk management team confidence ratings.  
Table 3.   Confidence Level Definitions 
Confidence Level Value 
High 0 – 0.30 
Medium >0.30 – 0.70 
Low >0.70 – 100 
 
The confidence level inputs from the risk board members should be evaluated 
against the programs set confidence level definitions. One must be careful to word the 
question in a positive way to get the correct percentage. For example, one should ask, 
“What is your trust level that the s/w programmers can complete the task?” versus “Do 
you think the s/w programmers can complete the task?” Table 4 presents the synthesized 
data for this example. 
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Table 4.   Confidence Level Data (Sample Data) 













Result Medium Confidence 
 
The data does not indicate any conflict and should be considered valid. The 
resultant trust factor for the confidence element is medium. This process needs to be 
repeated for the other confidence question. For brevity’s sake, assume that the group has 
a low trust level (0.8) that the program manager has a plan for the s/w development. 
There are two trust elements from the confidence element that are classified as medium 
and high. 
Next, the stakeholders have to assess whether the risk item has an element of 
vulnerability. Vulnerability is defined as “the expectation that an exchange partner will 
not engage in opportunistic behavior, even in the face of countervailing short-term 
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incentives and uncertainty about long-term benefits” (Chiles and McMackin 1996, 85). 
Trust is a positive term and vulnerability is more negative so the focus is on the rating of 
vulnerability toward the working relationship and communication (team cohesion) 
between the parties. As mentioned before, with respect to the book 5 Dysfunctions of a 
Team, a good indication of a partner’s vulnerability level is the health of communication 
between team members. Providing a subjective probability on the working relationship 
that does not contain conflict data and skew results may be difficult (due to personal 
friendship bias). Therefore, when assessing the vulnerability of a risk item, it is 
recommended to use the definitions of high, medium and low vulnerability presented in 
Table 5.  
Table 5.   Vulnerability Level Definition 
Vulnerability Level (Working Relationship 
/Team Cohesion) 
Definition 
High Worked with this company multiple times 
on similar scoped efforts, open 
communication is great 
Medium Work with this company once before on a 
smaller effort, but they have worked with 
other agencies, communication is good but 
not immediate 
Low Never worked with the company before, 
this is their first effort of this magnitude, 
communication is bad, employees must 
always go through supervisor before 
responding 
 
Examples of vulnerability questions are: 1) Do the s/w programmers personally 
benefit (i.e., bonuses) from the program’s success and/or getting the s/w completed on 
time? 2) Is the company acting in self-interest, or are they concerned about the success of 
the program? In addition, this approach to rating vulnerability should also be applied to 
the relationships between the prime contractor and their sub-contract teams. An example 
question would be “Are the prime contractor and subcontractor communicating 
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frequently and well?” For this research example, the program office has never worked 
with this contractor before, but the contractor has work with other government agencies. 
During the engineering development phase, the contractor team has identified some s/w 
problems but hesitates on communicating the problems to the government customer until 
the manager sets up a formal meeting. Based on this scenario, the IPT risk board 
members identified two vulnerability risks: lack of experience with contractor and 
communication slow down. Even though the IPT has not worked with the contractor 
before, other government agencies have so the risk board members assessed the first 
vulnerability risk as medium. The delay in communication should start to worry the team, 
since IPT cannot get direct answers to questions, so the IPT risk board assessed this 
vulnerability as low. 
The risk management team would complete the risk analysis with an assessment 
of the risk’s uncertainties. Uncertainty has a negative connotation, so to keep the ratings 
consistence with the other ratings, one should rate the level of uncertainty as the 
predictability level. Uncertainty can be difficult because it is based entirely on the future 
and what one does not know. Therefore, when assessing the uncertainty of a risk item, it 
is recommended to use the following default rating scale, see Table 6. 
Table 6.   Uncertainty Level Definition 
Uncertainty Level (Predictability) Definition 
High Company has multiple experiences with 
this technology and implementation 
Medium Company has used this technology but not 
for this application 
Low Company is inexperienced with this 
technology 
 
For this research example, the program requires converting an old computer 
language (FORTRAN) to C++. Currently, the software employee staff does not have a 
FORTRAN software programmer with professional experience. As a result, the risk 
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management team looks at the uncertainty level definition table and assessed the 
uncertainty of the contractor to deliver s/w on-time as low because the company has no 
prior experience with the FORTRAN software language. 
The summary of the completed risk analysis of risk item “Delivery of late s/w” is 
presented in Table 7. 
Table 7.   Risk and Trust Aggregate Example Summary 
Risk Element  
Technical Risk Level Low 
Confidence #1 Medium  
Confidence #2 Low 
Vulnerability #1 Low 
Vulnerability #2 Medium 
Uncertainty Low 
 
Taking all the risk elements and plotting them against the risk reporting matrix, 
the aggregate would be a medium risk (level 6). For the example, the addition of 
analyzing trust raised the level of risk. This analysis now gives the program manager 
more insight into the root cause of the risk and a better ability to manage/mitigate this 
risk with resources. It is important to note that trust is time dependent, and the level of 
trust can change rapidly. For example, a troublesome employee could be replaced by 
someone more competent. This action could improve confidence, vulnerability (working 
relations) and uncertainty (if the person were a FORTRAN s/w expert). Therefore, risk 
with trust elements must be monitored on a periodic schedule to manage trends as early 
as possible. 
As a result one can conclude that TRUST must be included as part of the risk 
management process to accurately identify cost, schedule, and technical risks that may 
occur in the future of a program.  
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E. STAKEHOLDER BUY-IN 
So this leads into the next consideration, “How will this affect the stakeholders of 
this process?” All the immediate stakeholders that this process will affect were listed in 
Table 8. Direct stakeholders are individuals or groups that are engaged in risk 
management process and the program contract. They include companies, customers, 
suppliers, government and contractor employees, policy makers, lawyers, and 
stockholders. Indirect stakeholders were defined as individual or groups who are not 
engaged in the risk management process and program contract but may be affected by or 
can affect its actions. They include the general public (tax payers), communities, activist 
groups, business support groups and the media. After the stakeholders were identified, 
the stakeholders were ranked based on their impact to the success of the project. The 
stakeholder requirements, needs and wants, were listed to ensure they were addressed 
(not necessarily met). Table 8 lists the top three rated stakeholders that this process 
affects. 
Table 8.   Stakeholder List 
Ranking Stakeholder Requirements/Wants/Needs 
1 The Integrate Program Team 
(Gov) 
Develop a higher fidelity Risk Management Tool to improve program 
success 
Create an unbiased way to measure Risk on program success 
Deliver a product to the fleet that meets their requirements to complete the 
mission 
Deliver a quality product at the lowest cost as quickly as possible 
Quickly identify high risk tasks that may impede the program to meet cost 
and schedule 
Spend less time in meetings 
The Program Executive 
Office 
 
Contractor Business Team Win the contract to make a profit  
Deliver a product to the fleet that meets their requirements to complete the 
mission 




2 Tax Payers Protect my tax dollars with a good investment decision 
Fleet Operators Provide a quality product quickly at the lowest cost 
Provide a product that meets my requirements to complete my mission 
 DOD Contracts Ensure all the requirements are being met 
Ensure the contractor is fulfilling his obligations 




Implementing the risk and trust aggregate risk process will likely be met with 
aversion and skepticism. The proposed change of incorporating trust to the current risk 
management process for DOD acquisition is an evolution change and therefore can be 
implemented rather easily with little training or disruption to the work culture of risk 
management. The addition of the trust element emphasizes the need for good 
communication and team cohesion. As trust builds, less time is required on monitoring 
each other, so validating progress and decisions can be made faster. These notions are 
supported by Naval Air Systems Command leadership of staying focused on the intent of 
the process and not over burdening the team in an effort to deliver a product to the fleet 
faster. 
This chapter evaluated the feasibility and value of incorporation trust into the 
DOD risk management process. Through logic and psychometrics studies of risk and 
trust, it was determined that risk and trust were inversely related. The Dempster-Shafer 
theory was used to prove that trust elements could be added long as there is no major 
conflict between the sources. The principle of indifference (Keynes 1921) supported the 
theory that each element should be weighed equally since we have no idea which element 
is more plausible. Alexander McNeil’s (2005) research on the axiom of coherence was 
applied to conclude that risk and trust elements were additive. Gary Langford’s (2007) 
method for managing complexity warranted the use of geometric relationships to 
combine risk and trust into a matrix report. A detailed step-by-step example of how to 
take a risk item through the proposed risk and trust management process for DOD 
acquisition was described. Qualitative assessment measurement definitions for all three 
trust elements; confidence, vulnerability, and uncertainty were created. The risk 
management example highlighted how a risk item that was assessed quantitatively as a 
low risk was raised to a medium risk when qualitative measurements (trust) were 
included in the evaluation. A stakeholder analysis was conducted to assess the impact of 
incorporating trust and the potential buy-in. The following chapter will examine a case 
study of the Boeing 787 Dreamliner to support the value of incorporating trust into the 
risk management process. 
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V. BOEING 787 DREAMLINER CASE STUDY 
The Boeing 787 Dreamliner case study will be used as a qualitative research tool 
to evaluate the whether trust is a valuable factor in the risk assessment process in 
identifying qualitative risk elements. The acceptance of using case studies as a legitimate 
research technique is still debatable. The following sections will provide a brief history of 
case study research, define case study and provide rationale for using a case study under 
certain conditions. The Boeing 787 Dreamliner case study was evaluated against the 
Robert Yin’s research on case study design and methods (Yin 2009) and Gary Langford’s 
research on engineering methods (Langford 2012). Once validated, the Boeing 787 
Dreamliner case study was used to evaluate the research question of how the addition of 
trust could serve to identify qualitative risks to facilitate better management decisions. 
Figure 10 presents a picture of the Boeing 787 Dreamliner aircraft. 
 
Figure 10.  Boeing 787 Dreamliner 
A. VALIDATION OF CASE STUDY RESEARCH 
1. History of Case Studies 
It can be difficult to conduct qualitative research because of its exploratory and 
subjective nature. There is only so much quantitative research and quantitative data that 
can be found and analyze in order to validate social theories. That is why case study 
research has been valuable to the field of qualitative research in social sciences. Case 
studies allowed social sciences to study human behavior from different aspects and 
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perspectives. However, the acceptance of using case studies has been debated since the 
early 1900s as a legitimate research technique (Tellis 1997). The first generation of case 
studies culminated in the Chicago school of sociology, in which the anthropologist’s field 
study method was practiced (Platt 1992). Chicago was the center for immigration and 
industry in the 1920s, which allotted it various ethnical backgrounds and poverty levels 
for the university social researchers to study (Hamel et al. 1993). After the Second World 
War, social science became dominated by the aspiration for quantitative analysis, called 
positivism. These positivism advocates called case study research soft science and 
criticized the methodology for not being scientific because of its qualitative nature. To 
avoid criticism, a majority of social science researchers went back to taking surveys, 
opinion polls, and developing quasi-experiments. Case study research was mostly dead 
until Glaser & Strauss introduced Grounded Theory in 1967 (Johansson 2003). Grounded 
Theory is a disciplined research method that advocated researchers to combine both 
quantitative and qualitative data to better appreciate the entire context of the research 
question being analyzed. The social science community seemed to accept this solution 
and so no significant advancements in the area of promoting case study research were 
made until the 1980s. Robert Yin took the next step and developed case study 
methodology to make it a rigorous and repeatable scientific method. He transferred 
experimental logic into the field of naturalistic inquiry and combined it with qualitative 
methods. Since the 1990s, there had been as increase in literature on case study 
methodology (Johansson 2003). Figure 11 depicts the history of case study methodology. 
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Figure 11.  History of Case Study Methodology (from Johansson 2003) 
A common criticism of the use of case studies for research is that its dependence 
on a single case renders it incapable of providing generalizing conclusions because it 
lacked a sufficient number of relevant examples. Hamel (Hamel et al. 1993) and Yin 
(1984/1994) forcefully argued that the relative size of the sample whether 2, 10, or 100 
cases are used, does not transform a multiple case into a macroscopic study. The goal of 
the study should establish the parameters, and then should be applied to all research. In 
this way, even a single case could be considered acceptable, provided it met the 
established objective (Tellis 1997). Yin is one of the leaders in case study research and 
has developed rigorous methods with which a case is constructed. His detailed case study 
methodology fulfills the three tenets of the qualitative method: describing, understanding, 
and explaining. Yin continues his research on case studies and case study methodology 
because he understands the benefits. According to Yin (2003a, 2) “the distinctive need 
for case studies arises out of the desire to understand complex social phenomena” 
because “the case study method allows investigators to retain the holistic and meaningful 
characteristics of real-life events,” such as organizational and managerial processes. The 
benefit can be taken from the following heuristic, “Good decisions come from 
experience, and experience comes from bad decisions” (Author Unknown). Currently, 
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case studies are used by multiple disciplines such as: psychology, sociology, political 
science, anthropology, education, medicine, community planning, and systems 
engineering. But even with all the current research and field expert backing, the merits of 
case study research are still debated today.  
2. Case Study and Case Study Validation 
In order to validate the use of a case study, it is important to define a case study. 
Yin (2003a, 13–14) defines a case study as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.” In other words, a case study is 
an analysis of a past event that looks at all the processes and behavior conditions that led 
up to the outcome of that particular event. The Boeing 787 Dreamliner case study fits this 
definition. The Boeing 787 Dreamliner case study conducted by Yao was a 
comprehensive empirical study of the actual events, process and facts of the design and 
manufacturing process of the Boeing 787 Dreamliner aircraft. But a case study is not just 
a historical account about what had happened. The case study must have a problem for 
the researcher to solve. To address this defined problem, the researcher must design a 
research strategy that encompassed the required step to conducting a valid case study. A 
research design is as a “blueprint” for the research, dealing with at least four problems: 
what questions to study, what data are relevant, what data to collect, and how to analyze 
the results (Philliber, Schwab, and Samsloss 1980). To start, the researcher should 
determine whether the case study will be one of three possible types exploratory, 
descriptive or explanatory. According to Yin, one needs to classify the type of research 
question being asked. Research questions that ask the “how” and “why” questions are 
more explanatory and more likely to lead to the use of case studies, histories, and 
experiments as the preferred research methods (Yin 2009). For case studies, 
contemporary events are preferred over historical events because access to research 
material such as personal interviews, current documentation, and artifacts has not been 
manipulated over time. The Boeing 787 Dreamliner case study is considered explanatory. 
The researcher, Yao, was trying to solve the problem of “how and why was the Boeing 
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787 Dreamliner manufacturing delayed?” According to Yin (2009), a case study should 
contain fives components of research design:  
1. a study’s questions; 
2. its propositions, if any; 
3. its units of analysis; 
4. the logic linking the data to the propositions; and 
5. the criteria for interpreting the findings. 
To this list, Langford adds the following comments about the scope of the 
research. All events cannot be considered. Therefore, the scope of the research needs to 
be constructed carefully to capture the causal event that links to the problem. Scope 
outlines the applicability of the tasks to the research. The scope of a research program 
determines the completeness for a given event’s causal relation to the questions of “how” 
and “why.” Since events have assumptions, those assumptions are tested for validity as 
part of the determination of validity of the case study based on the event selected. 
Another way of thinking about scope is that scope is the matchup of the boundaries of the 
event that are relevant over the life cycle of the problem. The scope of the research deals 
with the problem as that resulting from a systemic issue that is endogenous to the system. 
But the boundaries of the scope are less than the boundaries of the research. Scope 
determines the completeness for a given event in terms of its causal effect on the efficacy 
of the research, and therefore its validity (Langford 2012). 
3. The Boeing 787 Dreamliner 
The Boeing 787 Dreamliner first flew on December 15, 2009, under the guidance 
of the Boeing Test and Evaluation team. However, the path to the world’s first delivery to 
All Nippon Airways on September 25, 2011, was marked by a 40-month delay costing an 
additional $10 billion. The economic realities of benefit for the Dreamliner customers 
were to replace the 300–400 passenger Boeing 777 as it was believed to have been too 
expensive and too slow to return its investment to shareholders” (Flightglobal 2014). The 
Dreamliner was premised on satisfying a business development strategy of delivering the 
 64
aircraft faster, building it better, and making it cheaper (Denning 2013). The result was 
intended to be a three-phased development approach that first pushed the supply chain to 
deliver faster, then integrating significantly better performance, which precipitates a 
redesign for lower cost. Piepenbrock’s theoretical framework of Enterprise Architecture, 
Competitive Dynamics, Industrial Evolution, and Firm Performance (Piepenbrock 2004) 
summarizes the evolution of businesses based on solid product offerings that inspire 
customers to purchase. With regard to risk, the concatenation within the Piepenbrock 
framework is ontologically questionable, as there is a conflict of objectives without 
incorporating the feedback from one stage to the next. Risk is premised on the likelihood 
of a problem coupled with the consequence of that problem. Without a feedback 
mechanism, risk within such a framework would only grow as the project progresses. As 
with the systems engineering process models without feedback, the requirements stated at 
the onset of the project were not meant to be changed. As is the case with research-
inspired development, requirements posed at the beginning of a project as meant to be 
changed as a consequence of discoveries made during the progression of the work. The 
Piepenbrock framework is theoretical and perfectly suitable for traditional risk analyses. 
However, the notion of trust is missing from the Piepenbrock framework. 
The Boeing Case study will be analyzed against Yin’s (2009 fives components of 
research design. The first component required for case study research methodology is a 
clear case study question. The case study question will guide the entire case study 
process. As discussed earlier, research questions that ask the “how” and “why” questions 
are more explanatory and more applicable to case study research. The study question for 
the Boeing 787 Dreamliner case study was, “how and why was the Boeing 787 
Dreamliner manufacturing delayed?” The second component of case study methodology 
is to determine the propositions. Propositions are similar to thesis research questions, in 
that they direct attention to a certain location or person(s) that should be examined during 
research. These questions point the researcher in the direction of where to uncover 
evidence. There is no hard evidence that Yao created propositions when conducting the 
Boeing 787 Dreamliner case. However, one can conclude Yao must have created a 
proposition, since he was able to uncover the cause of the problem and obtained enough 
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empirical evidence to substantiate his claims. The third component of case study 
methodology is the unit of analysis. The unit of analysis is described as the case that is 
being solved. The researchers need to identify whether they are investigating a group of 
people, a single individual, or company. The unit of analysis should be related to the 
initial study question so it will help focus the researcher’s proposition questions on the 
case being examined. For the Boeing 787 Dreamliner case study, the researcher’s unit of 
analysis was the 100 outsourcing suppliers that Boeing had contracted for aircraft 
development and manufacturing. The fourth step to case study methodology is linking 
data to the previous propositions. During this phase, the researcher has taken all the data 
that is collected and is trying to discover patterns or collaborative details to support the 
research question. Common methods for linking data found during the case study to 
propositions are pattern matching, explanation building, time-series analysis, logic 
models, and cross-case synthesis (Yin 2009). For the Boeing case study, Mr. Zhao used 
“an integrated empirical-analytical approach where we combine a comprehensive 
empirical study of the actual events and facts with an economic analysis of financial 
incentives, gaming and risk in joint development programs” (Zhao 2012, 2). The fifth 
component for case study methodology is the criteria for interpreting a case study’s 
findings. A major and important alternative strategy is to identify and address rival 
explanations for the findings (Yin 2009). In other words, the researcher has to be 
prepared that the same scenario may be interpreted and/or explained opposing ways from 
multiple sources. As a result, the researcher must decide on which source will have 
greater weight in a given scenario prior to the data collection and analysis. Yao 
reconciled the qualitative analysis with practical evidence. He compared the data that was 
collected to the actions of the suppliers. The “reconciliation clearly shows that the delays 
occurred not because the suppliers weren’t able to do their jobs well but because they just 
didn’t want or care enough to do it well” (Zhao 2012, 12).  
The Boeing Case study will be evaluated against the Langford’s (2012) scope 
component of case study research methodology. The scope can be defined as the work 
that is necessary to complete the project, the case study research. The scope of a research 
program determines the completeness for a given event’s causal relation to the questions 
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of “how” and “why” (Langford 2012). The Boeing 787 case study covered the 787 
development background, the development chain, the management of the supply chain, 
the delay events, and an economic analysis. The background study of the Boeing case 
study was used to develop the proposition links by defining all the piece and process that 
were used to manufacture the test article. The development (supply) chain was analyzed 
to determine how the outsourcing structure was used and how well it was being managed. 
Each identified delay event (such as insufficient fasteners) was analyzed to subsidize the 
supply chain and management process research to develop a complete picture of what 
really happened. An economic analysis was conducted “to understand the firms’ financial 
incentives and unveil the trap induced by the risk sharing partnership” (Zhao 2012, 2). 
Since all events cannot be considered, assumptions must be made and tested for validity 
as part of the determination of validity of the case study (Langford 2012). One of the 
assumptions made Boeing was confident in their partnerships. There is no direct evidence 
in the confidence level of Boeing with its suppliers; however, Boeing did delegate all 
responsibility to the Tier one suppliers for design and integration. The second assumption 
made was that Boeing and the suppliers were following good business practice of trying 
to make money. It was determined “that each firm tried to delay behind the schedule or 
passed its unfinished work to others because by doing so, it can save its direct costs” 
(Zhao 2012, 13).  
In summary, the Boeing 787 Dreamliner case study met all the criteria for being 
classified as a case study. The case study research followed the rigorous methodology 
accepted by the field of social science and documented by the leading case study 
researcher Yin. The case study researcher had no financial ties to any of the stakeholders. 
The conclusions were based on a triangulated research collection of interview, artifacts, 
and documentation. Therefore, the Boeing 787 case study can be considered valid for 
future research studies to use. 
B. BACKGROUND OF THE 787 DREAMLINER PROGRAM 
The 787 Dreamliner was “Boeing’s next generation commercial aircraft targeted 
at the aviation market segment of rapid, direct and point-to-point connections” (Zhao 
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2012, 2). The 787 is a mid-sized aircraft that seats between 250–310 people. “The 
Dreamliner is unique in its extensive use of the lightweight composite materials, which 
accounted for about 50% of the airplane by weight, and 80% by volume” (Teresko 2007; 
Zhao 2012, 2). Overall, “the Boeing 787 Dreamliner was designed to cost less to operate 
and maintain than the current generation aircrafts” (Zhao, 2012, 2). In order to optimize 
the sales of the 787 Dreamliner, Boeing decided to use a global approach to the design, 
development, and manufacturing of the 787 Dreamliner commercial aircraft. Boeing had 
thought that if countries would be more willing to buy an aircraft in which that country 
had economic ties. As a result, the 787 Dreamliner had an unprecedented scale of 
development outsourcing— 65 percent of the development work was outsourced to more 
than 100 suppliers from 12 countries (Exostar 2007; Horng and Bozdogan 2007). The 
Tier 1 suppliers were responsible for design, fabrication, integration and assembly of the 
components from the Tier 2 and 3 suppliers. Figure 12 shows a breakout of the Tier 1 
suppliers. 
 
Figure 12.  Tier 1 Suppliers for the Boeing 787 Dreamliner (from Zhao 2012) 
In addition, Boeing also wanted to share the economic risk of such a big 
development effort with other countries in the event the 787 Dreamliner was a failure. 
The concept was that “suppliers share more than half of the upfront non-recurring R&D 
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investment (Lee and Anupindi 2009), which can be broken down as follows: Alenia 
($590 million), Japanese Heavies ($1.6 billion), Global Aeronautica (GA), Spirit, Vought 
($3.1 billion), and Boeing ($4.2 billion)” (Zhao 2012, 5). On paper, this seemed like a 
good plan. So, what could go wrong? 
The consequence was that the “first flight was delayed by 26 months and the first 
delivery was delayed by 40 months with a cost overrun of at least $10 billion” (Zhao 
2012, 1.  
C. ANALYSIS OF THE CASE STUDY 
The major hurdle derived from multiple companies who were jointly dependent 
on each other to control cost and maintain schedule. Boeing had to trust its suppliers to 
meet the schedule deadlines which sometimes meant trusting the other companies to put 
the 787 Dreamliner project’s success over their individual company’s success. The 
problem was that Boeing did not have a plan to manage this issue. As a result there were 
seven major delays that were recorded to explain the 40-month delay and $10 billion cost 
overrun. 
According to the case study, of the seven major delays, three could be attributed 
to technical issues, such as bad documentation, structural flaw in engineering design, and 
underestimated task duration. However, the other four major delays can be attributed to 
bad program risk management.  
1. How Could Trust Have Helped the Boeing 787 Dreamliner Program 
Risk Management? 
The trust factor is valuable in that is does not rely on technical risks to highlight 
risk items. It opens program managements thinking to linkages/codependences rather 
than individual event. Below are examples of how using the three elements of trust 
(confidence, vulnerability, and uncertainty) could have save the Boeing 787 Dreamliner 
cost and schedule. 
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a. Confidence 
Boeing selected the company “Vought to design and manufacture the world’s first 
all-composite aft-fuselage” (Zhao 2012, 8). However, at the time when selected, Vought 
had no engineering department. This apparent lack of an organizational recognition of an 
engineering skill may not have shown up on a typical risk matrix because there is not a 
technical or quantitative value to place on this item. However, if Boeing were to analyze 
this item from a trust perspective, it would have identified a low confidence level in 
selecting this company. If the company were already selected, the fact that Vought had no 
engineering department would have been identified as a high risk. 
b. Vulnerability 
For example, Vought waited until nearly the last moment (May 2006) to build the 
plant (job assigned November 2003, due May 2007). If Boeing were to analyze this item 
from a trust perspective, it would have realized that this company was not fully invested 
in the success of the overall 787 Dreamliner project. Boeing could have seen that Vought 
was putting its company first and only looking to do the bare minimum to fulfill its 
contract obligation.  
c. Uncertainty 
The production of the Boeing 787 Dreamliner adopted a new outsourcing model. 
Boeing opted to employ a tiered structure process that assigned the Tier 1 contractors as 
lead integrators, responsible for the assembly of different parts and subsystems provided 
from the Tier 2 and Tier 3 suppliers. This would not have shown up on a typical risk 
matrix because process was new and there were no quantitative technical measures that 
would highlight this integration process as a risk. However, if Boeing would have 
analyzed this from a trust perspective, Boeing would have identified that this process was 
different from their previous process in which Boeing played the traditional role of 
integrating and assembling different parts and subsystems. This identification of the risk 
earlier may have encouraged Boeing to take a bigger role in the integration of the 787 
Dreamliner program and prevented some of the schedule and cost over runs. 
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This chapter defined case study and the process to validate a case study for the 
purposed of using a case study as a research method. The Boeing 787 case study was 
validated and reinforced the argument that the incorporation of trust can be a valuable 
tool in assessing risk without the need for metrics and quantitative values. The following 
chapter will summarize this research paper with conclusion and recommendations 
supported by the previous chapters. In addition, several topics for future research studies 




VI. CONCLUSIONS RECOMMENDATIONS, AND  
AREAS OF FURTHER STUDY 
A. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this paper was to determine whether it was feasible and 
advantageous to incorporate “trust” into the risk management process for DOD 
acquisition. The premise was that there were hidden risk factors attributed to qualitative 
measures that were not being identified in the current risk management process. These 
qualitative measures of risk could be directly linked to trust elements. This research paper 
presented a sound argument on why trust should be incorporated into the risk 
management process for DOD acquisition programs. Various social, behavioral, 
theological, and technical expert definitions on the term trust were used to decompose 
trust into three key elements: confidence, vulnerability, and uncertainty. The three trust 
elements: confidence, vulnerability and uncertainty, were further defined and correlated 
with current industry program risk management practices. Based on the analysis of the 
three trust elements, trust was define for the purpose and use in risk management. Trust 
for risk management was defined as the subjective probability of a positive outcome from 
an agreement between two or more parties for a domain specific task based on the 
capability and goodwill of the trustee and predictability of a positive outcome within the 
defined technical, cost and schedule boundaries.  
Industry is starting to adopt qualitative risk management. Modernization of 
communication paths (i.e., e-mail and video teleconferencing), and quick technology 
advancement have opened industry to new partners in a global economy. In addition, 
there has also been an influx of business corruption that has left people and companies 
skittish about openly trusting their partners. New business partners lead to possible 
confidence, vulnerability, and uncertainty concerns. Companies have to weigh these trust 
elements when entering new partnerships and throughout the contract. To accentuate the 
point of global business partnership trust based risks, this research paper analyzed a case 
study on the Boeing 777 Dreamliner program which had an unprecedented scale of 
development outsourcing— 65 percent of the development work was outsourced to more 
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than 100 suppliers from 12 countries (Exostar 2007; Horng and Bozdogan 2007). A 
validation of the case study was conducted against Robert Yin’s research on case study 
design and methods (Yin 2009) and Gary Langford’s research on engineering methods 
(Langford 2012). The case study was concluded as valid and appropriate for analysis for 
the topic of this research on trust in risk management. The analysis of the case study 
determined there was risk items associated with each trust element (confidence, 
vulnerability, and uncertainty) that could have been identified earlier if trust had been 
incorporated into Boeing’s risk management process.  
Research was also conducted on the feasibility of incorporating the trust elements 
of risk into the risk management process for DOD acquisition. The relationship between 
trust and risk was defined from social science research and scientific methods. By 
examining social science research, it was determined that to capture the likelihood and 
consequence of an action that requires dependence on other individuals to take action, the 
element of trust should be assessed. Through logic and psychometrics studies of risk and 
trust, it was determined that risk and trust were inversely related. The Dempster-Shafer 
theory was used to prove that trust elements could be added long as there is no major 
conflict between the sources. The principle of indifference (Keynes 1921) supported the 
theory that each element should be weighed equally since we have no idea which element 
is more plausible. Alexander McNeil’s (2005) research on the axiom of coherence was 
applied to conclude that risk and trust elements were additive. However, the process is 
not simple mathematical addition, since trust and risk are inversely related. Gary 
Langford’s (2007) method for managing complexity warranted the use of geometric 
relationships to combine risk and trust into a matrix report.  
The current Risk Management Guide for DOD Acquisition (DOD 2006) was 
studied and the process was decomposed to determine how and where the qualitative 
measures (trust factors) of risk could be addressed. The most practical place for the trust 
elements of risk to be analyzed was during the analysis of the quantitative measurement 
of risk. A detailed step by step example of how to take a risk item through the proposed 
risk and trust management process for DOD acquisition was described. Qualitative 
assessment measurement definitions for all three trust elements; confidence, 
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vulnerability, and uncertainty were created. Example questions were also provided to 
assist in identifying trust risks. The risk management example highlighted how a risk 
item that was assessed quantitatively as a low risk was raised to a medium risk when 
qualitative measurements (trust) were included in the evaluation. 
In conclusion, this research paper posits that the incorporation of trust into the risk 
management process for DOD acquisition is feasible and advantageous. The proposed 
risk and trust management process will provide the program manager more insight into 
the root cause of the risk. Clearer insight into the root cause will aid in management of 
risk and resource allocation for mitigating risk. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the research and case study analysis it is recommend that trust be 
incorporated into the risk management process for DOD acquisition. The process as 
outlined in Chapter IV should be added to the Risk Management Guide for DOD 
Acquisition. This process will only enhance a program manager’s ability to understand 
the root cause of a risk item and properly mitigate the risk.   
C. AREAS OF FURTHER STUDY 
There is a vast amount of data and research that has been completed on the topic 
of trust. Due to time constraints and the abundance of information, all the topics related 
to this research could not be explored. Identified topics related to trust that may be 
worthy of future studies or analysis are provided below. 
1. The Risk of Firm Fixed Price vs. Cost Plus Incentive Fee Contracts 
There is an element of trust and risk involved in the decision of going with a Firm 
Fixed Price or Cost Plus Incentive Fee DOD acquisition contract. Generally, for a cost 
plus incentive fee DOD acquisition contract, the government assumes risk because the 
contractor can get more money if the program falls behind schedule or runs over cost. 
However, for a firm fixed price DOD contract, the contractor assumes most of the risk 
because there is no money to be gained if a program falls behind schedule or runs over 
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budget. However, a contractor may decide to terminate the contract if the company loses 
too much money on the program. In both cases, the government must trust the contractor. 
2. Analysis Qualitative + Quantitative Risk Management Results in the 
Commercial Business World 
It would be valuable to research companies that have included both qualitative 
and quantitative risk management practices into their business decision making process to 
determine whether it had a positive outcome. Asian companies appear to have the most 
experience with qualitative risk assessment. It would also be valuable to highlight some 
lessons learned using trust and risk factor based decision making. 
3. Analysis of Whether a Program That Places More Emphasis on Trust 
than Risk is More Efficient 
Most experts claim that a high level of trust allows for good communication and 
faster decision making. But blind trust can be equally damaging if unchecked. It would be 
interesting to determine if there is an optimum level of trust that will allow a program to 
be more efficient and how that level can be achieved. 
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APPENDIX.  BOEING 787 DREAMLINER CASE STUDY 
The 2012 Boeing 787 Dreamliner case study, by Yao Zhao, PhD, Associate 
Professor in Supply Chain and Project Management Rutgers, the State University of New 
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